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AL East · 2026 Report Cards

Grading the AL East: Tampa Bay Is Doing Rays Things Again

BBMI grades every team's season, roster, front office and manager before the trade deadline.

BBMI RESEARCH/JULY 30, 2026/MLB MODEL

The standings tell us that Tampa Bay leads the AL East. They do not fully explain how the Rays are doing it with baseball's 28th-highest tax payroll, or why Toronto is last despite spending nearly three times as much.

That requires a slightly more detailed report card.

Each organization receives four grades:

Overall team grade: Current record, BBMI ranking, playoff probability, World Series appearance probability and full-strength talent.

Players/roster grade: The underlying quality of the roster and the production delivered by individual players, supported by BBMI's offense, pitching and scoring-margin metrics. Talent establishes expectations; actual player production determines whether the roster met them.

Front-office grade: Talent and wins created relative to payroll, along with roster construction, depth and organizational direction.

Manager grade: Actual winning percentage relative to BBMI's record-neutral talent estimate, adjusted for scoring margin, injuries, role changes and the circumstances inherited by the current manager.

The overall grade is not a simple average of the other three. A talented team can have a disappointing season. A manager can do good work for a team whose front office has not. The Toronto Blue Jays have generously volunteered to demonstrate both concepts.

BBMI's rankings combine banked wins with a projection of the remaining schedule based on the current full-strength roster, corrected for schedule strength. Talent is a separate, record-neutral estimate of what a healthy roster should be capable of producing. BBMI's internal postseason methodology then simulates the rest of the season 10,000 times using Bayesian-shrunk team strength, prior-year Pythagorean performance, regression toward .500, log5 and home-field advantage. Each simulation plays through the complete postseason bracket.

The data below is frozen to BBMI's July 27 rankings and July 28 postseason simulation.

AL East grade book

TeamRecordWin %BBMI rankTalentWin % minus talentPlayoffWin divisionReach World SeriesTax payroll
Tampa Bay Rays62–43.5903rd.547+.04399%68%30.9%$108.4M · 28th
New York Yankees60–46.5664th.545+.02199%31%20.1%$337.0M · 3rd
Boston Red Sox55–50.5248th.538−.01480%1%8.5%$267.5M · 6th
Baltimore Orioles52–55.48618th.490−.00412%1%1.0%$217.5M · 14th
Toronto Blue Jays49–58.45823rd.499−.0412%1%0.2%$307.6M · 5th

BBMI's World Series figure is the share of simulations in which a team reaches the World Series, not its probability of winning it. Payroll figures are 2026 tax-payroll estimates via Spotrac, which include more than the salaries on the active roster.

Tampa Bay Rays

A+
Overall
A
Players/roster
A+
Front office
A
Manager

Tampa Bay is 62–43, third in BBMI and projected to finish 92–70. The Rays reach the postseason in 99% of BBMI's simulations, win the AL East in 68% and represent the American League in the World Series 30.9% of the time, the highest pennant probability in the league.

This would be an impressive season under any circumstances. Accomplishing it with baseball's 28th-highest tax payroll simply makes the rest of the division uncomfortable.

Players/roster grade: A

Junior Caminero has become the star around whom the Rays' offense revolves. He is batting .283 with 29 home runs, a .372 on-base percentage and a .915 OPS. Yandy Díaz is producing an .839 OPS, while Jonathan Aranda has reached base at a .377 rate with 14 home runs.

Tampa Bay also continues to manufacture useful complementary players. Chandler Simpson is batting .296 with 26 stolen bases, giving the lineup speed and contact even without much power. Cedric Mullins' .634 OPS has been disappointing, but the Rays have enough alternatives that one weak performance has not swallowed the offense.

The pitching has been even deeper. Drew Rasmussen owns a 3.07 ERA and 0.93 WHIP, Shane McClanahan has a 3.09 ERA, and Nick Martinez is 10–2 with a 2.45 ERA across 117⅓ innings. Bryan Baker has converted 28 saves with a 1.56 ERA and 0.84 WHIP.

That is not a rotation and bullpen built around one irreplaceable arm. It is a collection of pitchers making it difficult to identify which one was supposed to be the question mark.

The grade stops at A because BBMI's broader team metrics are excellent rather than overwhelming. Tampa Bay owns a plus-0.40 average scoring margin and 4.21 FIP. Those figures support a strong contender, but the 62–43 record is even better than the component performance.

Front-office grade: A+

Tampa Bay's estimated $108.4 million tax payroll ranks 28th in MLB. The Rays have spent approximately $229 million less than the Yankees and nearly $200 million less than Toronto while building the division's best record and highest World Series appearance probability.

Low spending alone does not merit praise. Refusing to spend and losing 100 games is not financial innovation; it is merely cheaper losing.

The Rays receive an A+ because the roster is legitimately good. BBMI rates Tampa Bay's full-strength talent at .547, essentially even with the Yankees and higher than 25 other teams. The organization has paired a bottom-three payroll with top-five talent, starting-pitching depth, a credible bullpen and a young middle-of-the-order star.

Other teams occasionally find undervalued players. Tampa Bay has turned finding them into something between an operating model and a minor irritation directed at the rest of the league.

Manager grade: A

Tampa Bay's .590 winning percentage is .043 higher than its .547 talent rating.

The Rays' scoring margin is not dominant enough to award an A+ without reservation, and some of the record-versus-talent gap may narrow over the final two months. But Kevin Cash continues to oversee constant role changes, matchup-based lineups and a pitching staff assembled with the assumption that no individual arm is allowed to become indispensable.

Verdict: Tampa Bay has the division's best record, best AL pennant probability and best talent-per-dollar result. The Rays have not discovered a new formula. They have simply resumed using the old one while everyone else complains that it is unfair.

New York Yankees

A
Overall
A
Players/roster
B+
Front office
A-
Manager

The Yankees are 60–46, fourth in BBMI and projected to finish 91–71. They reach October in 99% of simulations, win the division 31% of the time and reach the World Series in 20.1%.

New York has built a championship-caliber club. It has also paid championship-caliber prices, which is less a criticism than an acknowledgment that the Yankees are not participating in Tampa Bay's thrift competition.

Players/roster grade: A

Ben Rice has delivered one of baseball's biggest breakouts. He is batting .275 with 31 home runs, a .363 on-base percentage and a .948 OPS. His emergence has given the Yankees another elite power source rather than requiring the offense to wait for Aaron Judge to solve every problem personally.

Judge has been limited to 59 games but still owns a .908 OPS with 17 home runs. Paul Goldschmidt has produced 16 homers and a .798 OPS, while Cody Bellinger sits at .770. Jazz Chisholm Jr. has struggled to a .713 OPS but has compensated somewhat with 16 home runs and 29 stolen bases.

BBMI's underlying numbers reinforce the roster grade. New York has a 3.90 FIP and plus-0.83 scoring margin, giving the Yankees a stronger run-prevention profile than Tampa Bay and a more convincing margin than most teams with similar records.

The roster is not flawless. Judge's availability matters enormously, and Chisholm's on-base production has been weak. But Rice's breakout has reduced the offense's dependence on one superstar and given the lineup legitimate length.

Front-office grade: B+

New York's $337 million tax payroll ranks third in MLB. The Yankees are supposed to possess elite talent, and they do. Brian Cashman's group deserves credit for producing a balanced contender rather than merely an expensive collection of recognizable names.

Rice's development is especially valuable because internally produced star-level offense matters even to teams capable of purchasing most other needs. The pitching staff has also performed better than its recent reputation, with BBMI's 3.90 FIP among the stronger marks in the league.

The grade remains B+ because New York is receiving the result its spending demands. A top-three payroll should generate a top-five team. Meeting that standard is successful; it is not the same achievement as Tampa Bay meeting it for roughly one-third of the cost.

Manager grade: A-

New York's .566 winning percentage is .021 higher than its .545 talent rating. That gap is modest, but the plus-0.83 scoring margin indicates that the club's success is supported by its overall play.

Aaron Boone also deserves credit for keeping the Yankees within 2½ games of Tampa Bay while Judge missed substantial time. The roster was built to withstand more than most teams can, but losing the league's most intimidating hitter still qualifies as an inconvenience.

Verdict: The Yankees are excellent, expensive and almost certain to reach October. All three outcomes were reasonably foreseeable. The front office has purchased the premium product and, unlike several other high-payroll clubs, actually received it.

Boston Red Sox

B+
Overall
B+
Players/roster
B
Front office
A-
Manager

Boston's season has contained enough plot changes to require a recap.

The Red Sox started 10–17, fired Alex Cora in April and eventually became the hottest team in baseball under interim manager Chad Tracy. They are now 55–50, eighth in BBMI and projected to finish 85–77. BBMI gives them an 80% playoff probability despite only a 1% chance of winning the division.

The division title is probably gone. The season is very much alive.

Players/roster grade: B+

Willson Contreras has been Boston's best hitter, batting .287 with 22 home runs, a .389 on-base percentage and a .933 OPS. Ceddanne Rafaela has paired a .278 average with useful power and defense, while Wilyer Abreu has contributed 15 home runs and a .761 OPS.

The lineup also contains several reasons the season began badly.

Jarren Duran is batting .196 with a .595 OPS. Trevor Story has a .547 OPS, and Marcelo Mayer is at .594. A club paying for and expecting production from several established or highly regarded players has instead relied heavily on Contreras and a collection of late surges.

BBMI still rates Boston's talent at .538. The plus-0.46 scoring margin suggests the Red Sox have played better than their 55–50 record, even though their actual winning percentage remains .014 below the talent estimate.

The B+ is intentionally not an A-. Boston's players have recovered impressively, but the first three months count too. The roster has produced enough to become a likely playoff team, not enough to erase the underperformance that made the turnaround necessary.

Front-office grade: B

Boston's $267.5 million tax payroll ranks sixth in MLB. An 80% playoff probability is a positive outcome, but a high probability of earning a wild card is not extraordinary for a team spending more than all but five clubs.

Craig Breslow's roster deserves credit for having enough talent to recover from a disastrous start. Contreras has been an impact player, and the pitching has stabilized enough for the offense's improvement to matter.

Still, the lineup includes too many underperforming players for the front office to receive an A-level grade. Boston did not spend $267 million with the goal of reaching late July seven games behind Tampa Bay and hoping the wild-card standings remain welcoming.

Manager grade: A-

The manager grade is specifically for Chad Tracy, not a blended judgment of the entire season.

Boston was 10–17 when Cora was dismissed. Tracy eventually guided the Red Sox through a 13-game winning streak and helped transform a team that looked finished into an 80% playoff proposition.

The grade stops at A- because Boston's full-season record remains below its talent estimate, and Tracy inherited a roster with a top-six payroll and legitimate ability. But the direction of the season changed dramatically after he took control.

This is one of the rare cases in which "interim" has described the contract more accurately than the performance.

Verdict: Boston's April deserves a poor grade. Its current trajectory does not. The Red Sox remain flawed and expensive, but Tracy's turnaround has converted a lost season into a likely playoff appearance.

Baltimore Orioles

C-
Overall
C
Players/roster
C
Front office
C
Manager

Baltimore is 52–55, 18th in BBMI and projected to finish 79–83. The Orioles reach the playoffs in only 12% of simulations and the World Series in 1%.

This is not a catastrophic season in isolation. It is disappointing because Baltimore entered this competitive cycle expecting its young core to become one of baseball's defining rosters.

Instead, the Orioles have become ordinary with unusual efficiency.

Players/roster grade: C

Pete Alonso has supplied needed middle-of-the-order production, hitting 22 home runs with an .815 OPS. Adley Rutschman has rebounded to a .764 OPS, and Samuel Basallo has provided 16 home runs as another young power source.

The problem is Gunnar Henderson.

Henderson is batting .221 with a .292 on-base percentage and .693 OPS. Coby Mayo has 14 home runs but only a .680 OPS, while Colton Cowser sits at .647. Baltimore's young hitters have produced enough power to remain interesting but not enough complete offense to drive a contender.

BBMI rates the roster at .490, almost exactly matching its .486 winning percentage. The Orioles have a minus-0.10 scoring margin and 4.32 FIP. That is the profile of a slightly below-average team, not an elite roster suffering through random misfortune.

Baltimore's roster remains interesting in theory. In practice, too many players expected to lead its competitive window are having ordinary or poor seasons. A C grades the production; a C+ would grade the prospect pedigree.

Front-office grade: C

Baltimore's estimated $217.5 million tax payroll ranks 14th. The Orioles are no longer operating like a purely low-cost rebuilding club, which means the standard has changed.

Adding Alonso addressed the need for a proven power bat, but the roster remains uneven. The pitching is ordinary, several young hitters have stalled, and the farm system's promise has not translated into the expected major-league dominance.

Mike Elias' group deserves credit for building the foundation that made meaningful expectations possible. It receives a C because the current roster has not advanced beyond that foundation.

At some point, organizational potential must become a current-tense sentence.

Manager grade: C

Craig Albernaz took over before the season as one of nine new MLB managers. His team's record is almost perfectly aligned with BBMI's talent estimate, and the scoring margin is similarly neutral.

That produces an unspectacular but fair grade. There is little evidence that Albernaz has dramatically elevated the roster, but there is also little evidence that the Orioles are losing because of some obvious managerial failure.

The larger problem is that the roster itself is not as good as expected.

Verdict: Baltimore is not collapsing. It is hovering, which may be more frustrating for an organization that expected to be ascending.

Toronto Blue Jays

D
Overall
D+
Players/roster
D
Front office
D
Manager

Toronto is 49–58, 23rd in BBMI and projected to finish 77–85. The Blue Jays reach the playoffs in 2% of simulations and the World Series in 0.2%.

Their tax payroll is approximately $307.6 million, fifth-highest in baseball.

There are cheaper ways to miss the playoffs. Most of them are being demonstrated elsewhere in this article.

Players/roster grade: D+

Kazuma Okamoto leads Toronto with 23 home runs, but his .224 average and .745 OPS represent solid production rather than star-level output. Ernie Clement is batting .296 with a .746 OPS, giving the club one of its more reliable everyday performances.

The more important names have not produced enough.

Vladimir Guerrero Jr. has only six home runs and a .700 OPS. Andrés Giménez sits at .634, Daulton Varsho at .685 and George Springer at .708. Toronto has assembled a lineup full of players recognizable enough to be expensive and ordinary enough to explain the standings.

BBMI's .499 talent rating suggests the full-strength roster should be approximately average. The Blue Jays are winning at a .458 rate and being outscored by 0.57 runs per game.

The talent estimate keeps the grade above a D, but the actual players have earned no more than a D+. Toronto's lineup contains too many recognizable names producing unrecognizable results.

Front-office grade: D

Toronto has MLB's fifth-highest tax payroll and the AL East's worst record. The Blue Jays are spending approximately $200 million more than Tampa Bay to sit 13½ games behind them.

Ross Atkins' front office has built a roster with respectable individual names but poor collective impact. The offense lacks enough elite production, the supporting players have not raised the floor, and the club's underlying performance is consistent with the disappointing record.

The D rather than F recognizes that BBMI still sees roughly average talent and that several players retain plausible rebound value. But a top-five payroll paired with a 2% playoff probability requires more than gentle disappointment.

Manager grade: D

John Schneider entered 2026 after leading Toronto to the 2025 AL pennant. This year's club is winning .041 below its talent estimate and carries a minus-0.57 scoring margin.

The negative margin makes it difficult to blame close-game variance. Toronto has not merely lost an unlucky collection of one-run games. It has played like a losing team.

Schneider does not control roster construction or individual regression. He does, however, manage an expensive team that has fallen well below both its talent baseline and organizational expectations.

Verdict: Toronto has combined average talent, premium spending and poor results. It is the baseball equivalent of paying extra for a middle seat and then discovering the flight has a connection.

Final AL East report cards

TeamOverallPlayers/rosterFront officeManager
Tampa Bay RaysA+AA+A
New York YankeesAAB+A-
Boston Red SoxB+B+BA-
Baltimore OriolesC-CCC
Toronto Blue JaysDD+DD

The division’s biggest lesson

The AL East is not simply a division of rich teams and the Rays.

Tampa Bay and New York have built similarly talented clubs through completely different financial models. Boston has rescued its season through a managerial change and a historic winning streak. Baltimore's promising core has become merely average, while Toronto has converted a top-five payroll into last place.

The Rays receive the division's only A+ because they have produced both excellence and efficiency.

The Yankees have nearly matched the excellence. They have merely used an additional $229 million to do it.

Sources

Team records, BBMI rankings, talent ratings, playoff, division and World Series probabilities, and scoring margins: BBMI July 27 power rankings and July 28 postseason simulation (MLB Power Rankings, MLB Playoff Odds & Bracket Pulse). Player statistics: MLB.com team stats. Payroll figures: 2026 tax-payroll estimates via Spotrac.

Disclosure: analytical and educational content about model performance. Not betting advice. Rankings, forecasts, and probabilities are model outputs, not financial or betting advice, and past performance does not guarantee future results.