Grading the NL East: Atlanta Is Winning, Washington Is Confusing Everyone, and the Mets Have Invented Luxury Failure

Players/roster grade: A-

Matt Olson is having another elite power season, batting .264 with 27 home runs and an .866 OPS. Rookie catcher Drake Baldwin has added 20 homers with an .850 OPS, while Michael Harris II is batting .298 with 19 home runs and an .829 mark.

That trio has given Atlanta star production at first base, catcher and center field.

The roster has not received peak performance from everyone. Austin Riley is batting .216 with a .644 OPS, and Ronald Acuña Jr. has a .788 OPS in 54 games. Ozzie Albies has been useful rather than dominant at .754.

Atlanta's plus-0.91 scoring margin confirms that the collective output remains excellent even with several established stars performing below their best. The 4.26 FIP is less impressive and prevents an A+ roster grade.

The players receive an A- because the team is 62–44 and consistently outscoring opponents. This is not an award for reputation. It is credit for a roster whose productive players have covered for the stars having ordinary seasons.

Front-office grade: A

Atlanta's $255.5 million tax payroll ranks eighth. The Braves are not a low-budget club, but they are spending substantially less than the Mets, Phillies, Yankees, Blue Jays and Dodgers while leading a difficult division.

Alex Anthopoulos' organization has built the type of depth that allows Riley and Acuña to be less than extraordinary without derailing the season. Baldwin's immediate impact is particularly important: star-level production from a young catcher creates both present value and future flexibility.

The A reflects a roster that is expensive but coherent. Atlanta has allocated resources around a durable core, developed reinforcements and avoided becoming dependent on every veteran producing at career-best levels.

Manager grade: A+

Walt Weiss entered 2026 as one of MLB's nine new managers. His team is winning 58 points above its .527 talent estimate and owns a plus-0.91 scoring margin.

That combination matters. Unlike some overachieving teams, Atlanta's record is not being propped up by a negative run differential. The Braves are consistently outplaying opponents while also converting that performance into wins.

Weiss inherited a strong organization, so he did not begin with the same degree of difficulty as Cleveland or Washington. He has nevertheless maximized it.

Verdict: Atlanta is winning comfortably despite incomplete seasons from several stars. That is what real roster depth looks like: the team remains excellent before everyone becomes excellent.

Players/roster grade: B+

Kyle Schwarber is once again producing as baseball's least conventional leadoff hitter, with 33 home runs, a .365 on-base percentage and .910 OPS. Bryce Harper has 22 homers with an .850 OPS, while Brandon Marsh has provided 16 home runs and a .787 mark.

The lineup's expensive supporting cast has been less convincing.

Trea Turner owns a .682 OPS, Alec Bohm is at .653, J.T. Realmuto at .664 and Adolis García at .599. Philadelphia has two elite run producers and several recognizable hitters performing like the names on their jerseys should carry partial credit.

The pitching has kept the roster grade high. BBMI lists a 3.85 FIP, best in the division and one of baseball's stronger marks. The Phillies' .549 talent estimate is also higher than Atlanta's.

An A- would reward championship-caliber ability without sufficiently penalizing a 57–50 record, slightly negative scoring margin and the poor production that helped create the 9–19 start. B+ recognizes a dangerous roster whose players have made the regular season unnecessarily difficult.

Front-office grade: B

Philadelphia carries a $315.2 million tax payroll, fourth-highest in MLB. Dave Dombrowski has built a roster with championship talent, but the cost and uneven lineup production raise the standard.

The Phillies deserve credit for constructing a pitching staff capable of stabilizing the season and enough star power to remain dangerous in October. They also entered the year with an aging, expensive group whose disastrous start required a managerial change before May.

The B recognizes the difference between talent accumulation and organizational efficiency. Philadelphia has built a team capable of reaching the World Series. It has not built one that should have needed a historic recovery merely to secure a wild-card position.

Manager grade: A

Mattingly took over after Philadelphia's 9–19 start. By late June, the Phillies had gone 36–17 under him, and they continued climbing back into a probable playoff position.

The full-season winning percentage remains 16 points below BBMI's talent estimate, but that gap largely reflects the team Mattingly inherited. His tenure has been a clear success.

The A stops short of A+ because Philadelphia still trails Atlanta by 5½ games and owns a slightly negative scoring margin. The turnaround has been excellent; the complete team performance remains imperfect.

Verdict: Philadelphia's April was an F. Its roster is a B+. Mattingly's recovery effort earns an A.

The overall B+ is what remains after the arithmetic and emotional processing are complete.

Players/roster grade: B+

James Wood has become a franchise cornerstone, batting .272 with 30 home runs, 16 stolen bases, a .398 on-base percentage and .954 OPS. CJ Abrams has been nearly as good, hitting .295 with 27 homers, 19 steals and a .938 OPS.

Luis García Jr. has added 21 home runs and an .857 OPS, while Curtis Mead has supplied 17 homers with an .852 mark. Washington's young offensive core is not merely promising. It is already productive.

The roster grade stops short of A because the pitching is far behind the offense. BBMI lists a 4.81 FIP, one of baseball's worst marks, and Dylan Crews has managed only a .692 OPS.

The players deserve an upgrade because a .436 talent estimate does not erase what they have accomplished. Four young hitters are having excellent seasons, the team is above .500 and the scoring margin is positive. The low talent estimate describes the weaknesses. The B+ grades the production.

Front-office grade: A-

Washington's $117.2 million tax payroll ranks 25th. The organization has produced a winning record and one of baseball's most exciting young lineups with a bottom-six financial commitment.

Wood, Abrams, García and Mead give the Nationals a credible offensive foundation. That is the point at which a rebuild begins to become visible without requiring a prospect-ranking subscription.

The A- rather than A reflects the pitching deficit. A 4.81 FIP and .436 talent estimate indicate that the front office has built half of the next contender. The half it built is very good. The other half remains a scheduling concern.

Manager grade: A+

Blake Butera is in his first season after being hired as one of MLB's nine new managers. Washington is winning 69 points above its talent estimate, the largest positive gap in the NL East.

The plus-0.27 scoring margin gives the overperformance some support. Washington is not merely surviving through an impossible close-game record; it has slightly outscored opponents.

Butera has helped young hitters produce immediately while keeping a weak pitching staff from overwhelming the season.

Verdict: Washington probably is not a true playoff team. It is already a credible baseball team, which arrived earlier than many expected and is substantially more useful than another year of discussing timelines.

Players/roster grade: C+

Otto Lopez is batting .331 with nine home runs, 22 stolen bases and an .861 OPS. Liam Hicks has produced a .796 OPS, while Heriberto Hernández owns 15 home runs and an .800 mark.

Kyle Stowers and Owen Caissie have added useful power, and Griffin Conine has an .887 OPS in 40 games. Xavier Edwards continues to reach base and provide speed with a .771 OPS.

The weak point is depth and certainty. Several of Miami's best performances have come in limited samples, Jakob Marsee sits at .614, and the club lacks an established star comparable to Wood, Soto, Harper or Olson.

BBMI's .488 talent rating and plus-0.03 scoring margin describe the Marlins accurately: approximately average and nearly even.

The players receive a C+ because they have been respectable, not because they are inexpensive. The low payroll makes the front office impressive. It does not automatically make the roster above average.

Front-office grade: A-

Miami's $82.6 million tax payroll is the lowest in MLB. The Marlins are spending roughly $293 million less than the Mets and have eight more wins.

Peter Bendix's front office deserves credit for identifying useful, inexpensive position players and constructing a roster capable of remaining competitive.

The grade stops at A- because the team is still only 20th in BBMI with a 10% playoff chance. Efficiency is not the same as championship quality. The next step is turning a collection of value discoveries into a roster with more star-level impact.

Manager grade: B

Clayton McCullough's Marlins are winning seven points above their talent estimate and have an almost perfectly neutral scoring margin.

That is modest overperformance rather than a dramatic managerial effect. McCullough has kept a young, inexpensive roster competitive without evidence that the team is wildly exceeding or falling below its underlying quality.

Verdict: Miami has built a respectable team for almost no money by MLB standards. Ownership will presumably study the success and conclude that even less spending may now be possible.

Players/roster grade: C+

The Mets are talented. At some point, however, the players have to be held responsible for what that talent has produced.

Juan Soto has fulfilled his part of the arrangement, batting .283 with 21 home runs, a .408 on-base percentage and a .947 OPS in 84 games. Francisco Alvarez has also been productive, contributing 12 home runs and a .791 OPS.

After that, the evidence becomes substantially less flattering.

Marcus Semien is batting .214 with a .629 OPS. Mark Vientos sits at .644, Bo Bichette at .680 and Carson Benge at .712. Francisco Lindor has produced a .743 OPS in 50 games, respectable in isolation, but not close to the star-level production the Mets need from one of the roster's central players.

Those are not merely front-office abstractions. They are established or important players having poor seasons.

The pitching staff and defense also belong to the roster evaluation. A team cannot fall 17 games below .500 with one of baseball's highest talent estimates unless failures occur across multiple parts of the active roster. Managers influence deployment and preparation, but they do not take the at-bats, throw the pitches or convert the balls in play.

The C+ recognizes that the roster still contains legitimate high-end talent and that Soto has performed like a superstar. It also recognizes that talent without production is potential, not performance.

A B would grade the names. A C+ grades the season they are actually having.

Front-office grade: F

The Mets' estimated $375.9 million tax payroll ranks second only to the Dodgers. New York has spent approximately $293 million more than Miami to produce eight fewer wins.

David Stearns did not assemble a talentless team. That might actually be easier to explain. He assembled one BBMI rates among baseball's best and watched it perform like one of its worst.

Roster fit, depth, pitching stability and contingency planning all belong in the evaluation. A front office receives no efficiency credit for theoretically possessing talent that never becomes useful in the standings.

Manager grade: F

The F applies to the season's dugout performance, not solely to interim manager Andy Green.

Carlos Mendoza was dismissed in late June after the team's poor start and prolonged losing stretches. Green took over on an interim basis, but the Mets continued falling out of contention.

No manager can single-handedly cause a 126-point gap between talent and winning percentage. No manager involved in that season can receive a passing grade either.

Verdict: The Mets have demonstrated that money cannot buy happiness, a division title or competent talent conversion.

The players are not innocent bystanders. The front office bought the roster, the managers deployed it and the players produced the 45–62 record.

There is enough blame here for everyone.